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ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOVIET AZERBAUAN

Bradford R. McGuinn
Florida International University

Introduction
An Empire in decline is never a pretty sight. Its rulers
indecisive, its institutions diminished and ridiculed, its legitimacy
no longer self-evident, its power no longer feared: such a power
becomes a danger to itself and the world within which it lives. As
the sequels to the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires reveal such
implosions occasion disorder and violence of an intensity to
obscure whatever hopes attended their destruction. Might not this
apply to Gorbachev's Soviet Union, the "Sick Man" ofEurasia? 1
Or, is it that the USSR is a superpower in transition, a potentially
dynamic international force capable of overcoming its maladies
and divisions? 2 The Soviet future is dim and uncertain. All that
may be safely said is that there can be no going back; powerful
forces have been unleashed, ones which may deliver the USSR
from its predicament or ensure its demise. Nowhere is this better
symbolised than by the explosion of ethnic nationalist, and
religious movements which have surfaced over the past several
years. "Passions", Mikhail Gorbachev conceded, "are now running out of control". 3 Ethnonationalism has indeed resurfaced in
the USSR.
About this there should be little surprise. Yet, Sovietologists are not alone in their underestimation of the "subnational"
level of analysis. Indeed, the changes in the Soviet Union pose a
challenge equally to students of international relations. At first
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sight, no incompatability would seem to exist between the discipline of International Relations and the phenomenon of ethnic
nationalism. After all, many of the more intractable and sanguine
problems in world politics have ethnonationalism as their essence, from Northern Ireland to Ethiopia, from Israel to Canada.
Yet, ethnonationalism remains a factor with which the
discipline has not adequately to come to terms. This is not an
arbitrary lapse but rather a systematic bias, the result of a combination of intellectual prejudices. There has, first, been a central
focus on the "nation-state" as the primary actor in world politics.
Such a tendency is associated with Realist Theory much as it was
with the early developmental speculations regarding "nationbuilding".4 There has been, secondly, an equally intense focus on
the "international level" of analysis emphasizing regional integration, world society, and international organizations. This has been
the prediliction of the pluralist theorists. 5 One may point, thirdly,
to the influence of globalist or Marxian theories which posit a
vision of transcending concepts of class and competition among
socio-economic systems. 6 All of these perspectives share an
analytical bias against the subnational forces of ethnicity and
religion. But, this bias was in many ways inevitable. It merely
reflected the general tendencies of modern Western thought:
secular and melioristic; focused on commonalities rather than
differences; integration rather than fragmentation, cooperation
rather than conflict and, above all, on the power of transcending
idea-systems and loyalties over "traditional" or "narrow" ones.
A price was paid for this prejudice as the West watched,
in powerless amazement, the ethnic and religious resurgence of
the late 1970s and 1980s. And, now as the Twentieth Century
nears its end one may observe not, as earlier assumed, the
realization of universal comity informed by enlightened secular
values but instead a spectacle of religious intolerence and ethnonationalist conflict. A more profound shock to the modernist
sensibility could not have been imagined.
It is the purpose of this essay to examine the reemergence
of ethnonationalism in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan with
specific emphasis on the affect it may have on international
politics. This shall entail first an historical overview of Azerbaijan, a discussion of its emergent "civil society" as well as its
"conflict society", followed by some observations regarding the
connections between Azerbaijani ethononationalism and
internationalism.
The Historical Evolution of Azerbaijan
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"It is," Abulfaz Aliev of the Azerbaijani Popular Front
asserted, "only a matter of time until Azerbaijan becomes an
independent country." 7 This view, while by no means the dominant one in the Republic goes, nevertheless, to the heart of the
matter. What are the potentials for the rise of Azeri ethnonationalism and to what extent will it involve a move toward secession?
A brief examination of the history of this troubled area reveals the
problematic nature of this undertaking.
Azerbaijan, the "land of fires", denotes a region surrounded to the north by the Caucaus Mountains, to the east by the
Caspian Sea, to the West by the Armenian Highlands, and to the
South, by Iran. It is an area of great geopolitical significance, a
corridor between Orient and Occident. 8 Its location and oil wealth
made it the site of invasions and the focus of Russian, Turkish, and
Persian imperial rivalries.
Before the Russian conquests of the 19th Century, Azerbaijan was ruled by a variety of Khanates which presided over a
deeply fragmented realm. 9 In no way did "traditional" Azeri
society furnish a sense of "national identity". 10 Such notions
arrived only as part of a phenomena felt across the Muslim world
during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries: the impact of the
West.11This was the central event in Azerbaijan's modem history.
The triumph of the West meant the proliferation ofits ideas. These
ideas, secular and activist could not but be subversive to the
traditional societies of the East, challenging conventions and
introducing hitherto forbidden possibilities, specifically in the
pursuit of temporal millenium through the agency of politics. 12
Azerbaijan, thus, underwent its "national awakening" at
this time, concomitant with a host of other groups: Armenians,
Jews, Kurds, and Arabs. The search for an ideologically contrived
identity involved several general currents of thought. One was
Pan-Islamism or Islamic Modernism. This was a hybrid doctrine,
an attempt by theorists such as Jamal Afghani to srnthesize Islam
with the Western ideological mode of thought. 1 A second was
Pan Turkism or Turkish nationalism. Based on the notion of a
collective Turkish identity, this doctrine was also a hybrid, a
combination of Ottoman universalism and Western nationalism.14In these two viewpoints one may observe a critical tension
between religious and ethnic appeals. Standing apart from these
nominally "indigenous" orientations were a range of Western
constructs from liberalism to social democracy .15 These doctrines
were most often associated with Azerbaijan's minorities: Armenians, Russians and Jews. 16
This doctrinal diversity existed during that critical period
between the decline of the Russian Empire and the consolidation
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of Leninism. It was in the first eruption of Azeri "Civil Society",
when nascent expressions of an Azerbaijani identity were made
explicit through resistance to Russian authority, violence against
the Armenian community, the appeals for sponsorship to the
Great Powers and finally in the creation, in 1918, of the independent Azerbaijani Democratic Republic.17For two years the Azeris
were and ethnic group, a nation, with a state, replet with a postage
stamp, a flag, and diplomatic missions. Yet, it was a polity living
on borrowed time. In 1920, the Bolsheviks moved to end the
Republic and bring it once again under Moscow's control.
"From today", Lenin told the non-Russians of the new
USSR, "your beliefs and customs and your national and cultural
institutions are declared free and inviolate. 18 Lenin's emphasis on
national self-determination reflected his desire to, at once, destroy
the Russian Empire and gain the fealty of the vast non Russian
population. 19 Ultimately, however, the logic of Leninism with its
emphasis on class rather than national loyalties ran counter to the
logic of ethnonationalism. 20 Furthermore, Azerbaijan's strategic
location and oil wealth had, for Lenin, as it had for the Czars, the
logic of Realpolitik. Thus, it was that in 1920 Lenin dispatched the
troops to take Baku.
The totalitarian implications of Lenin's polity had their
grim enactment during the long Stalinist era. Azerbaijan was
subject to the purges, terror, and genocide familiar to otherregions
as well as to the systematic attempt to erase any sense of ethnic and
religious distinctiveness. 21 The violence abated under Khrushchev
and Brezhnev as Azerbaijan was subject to "socialist development," the tangible result of which was the proliferation of local
mafias as the terror-polity turned increasingly into, simply, a
corrupt one. 22
Gorbachev has inherited this dubious legacy. By the time
of his accession in 1985, it was evident that seven decades of
Sovietism had not produced a socialist arcadia, an integrated state,
a "new man" but, rather, intense ethnonationalist and religious
resentment. Today, every corner of the USSR is animated by
ethnic, nationalist and religious restlessness. 23 Nowhere has this
tendency assumed more violent dimensions than in Azerbaijan. 24
The salient events there are well known: a conflict between Azeris
and Armenians over disputed territory initiated a cycle of violence
which involved pogroms and population transfers. Demonstrations occurred along the Iranian border with calls for "Greater
Azerbaijan", widespread fighting in Azerbaijan and Armenia
erupted resulting in the dispatch of Soviet troops to Baku which,
in tum, instigated conflict in which both Azeris and Armenians
were against Soviet authorities. By 1990 much of Azerbaijan had
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reached the point of anarchy, representing for the USSR the
greatest secession threat since 1918.

The Return of Azerbaijani Civil Society?
Whither Azerbaijan? It is not inevitable that a polity
characterized by internal fragmentation or subject to arbitrary
boundary division by stronger powers should become prey to
violent ethnonationalism or intemporate irredentism. Such conditions are known to states the world over. It is when these cleavages
and divisions are politicized and made the basis of ideology, that
tension and conflict become likely . Is a viable civil society, that
constellation of human relationships standing between the individual and the state, one which could serve, in conjunction with a
disinterested form of rule, to put a break in ethnonationalist
distemper likely to emerge in a post-Leninist Azerbaijan?
There are few grounds for optimism. A stable civil
society was unknown to the three historical legacies central to the
political culture of modern Azerbaijan. The first was Islamic. 25
Although tolerance for ethnic and religious minorities was an
established principle of Ottoman rule, the traditional Islamic
polity is, nevertheless, one which admits no independent, secular,
society to exist. Only two political classes were recognized: ruler
and ruled. 26 The second was that of the Russian Empire. Here one
may observe a case in which the state was stronger than the
society, obviating until its last years the emergence of a civil
society. 27 As it happened, however, this was eclipsed by Leninism, Azerbaijan's third great legacy. In the Leninist polity the
society is dominated not only by the state, but by an ideologically
defined party. 28 The civil society emerging today in Azerbaijan
has to work against this pedigree of intolerance, which affords
Azeris little preparation for the management of ethnic, national
and religious passions which characterize this fragmented region.
The divisions are indeed pronounced. Religiously, Azerbaijan is divided between Muslims, who constitute the vast
majority, and other groups, notably Christians and Jews. 29 The
Muslims are, in turn, split between the majoritarian Shi 'i and the
Sunnis as well as by various Sufist orders. While no absolute
correlation exists between sectarian affiliation and ideological
conviction, it would seem that the Shi 'i reflect the traditionalist or
populist Islamic orientation while the Sunnis have been particularly receptive to Turkish nationalism. 30 Ethnically, Azerbaijan is
host to a myriad of groups: Turks, Persians, Kurds, Armenians,
Jews, Georgians and others. 31 Tensions between the Turkish
Azeris who represent the majority and such rivals as the Armeni-
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ans whose numbers exist in large Azeri cities have often escalated
to physical violence. Divisions exist also between urban and rural
Azeris, modernized and traditional groups as well as between
tribes and kinship groups.
As in the Middle East several levels of loyalty identification have vied for influence throughout the modem history of
Azerbaijan. The first may be termed universalism, a "horizontal"
loyalty focus, predicated on a transcending concept of religion or
ethnicity. 32 Such a perspective is aloof to concerns for national
boundaries and therefore runs counter to the logic of the modem
state system . Though it has, in its many variants, enj oyed wide
subscription, it has met with few tangible achievements. The
second is nationalism, a "vertical" loyalty pattern based on a sense
of distinct national identity. 33 This has, of course, been the
predominant force in recent and contemporary International
Relations. But, for those "nationalities" bereft of a state this
nationalism represents a revolutionary force. It is presumably in
this nationalist form that Azerbaijan's threat to secede from the
USSR is the greatest. Yet, the prospects for this are undermined
by the third level, that of "particularism". 34 This may be defined
variously as subnationalism, tribalism religious or ethnic nationalism. Here, the basic sense of identity is defined very narrowly,
whereby the interests of, for example, the tribe or clan are seen as
paramount to national or universalist concerns. 35 It has been the
case in several states, notably Iraq and Ethiopia, that members of
small constituencies manage to assume power and seek to identify
the state with their sect and orientation. Which tendency prevails
currently in Azerbaijan is as yet unclear . One may only say that
no consensus has been reached. Therefore, expectations of a
coherent Azeri national assertion with a view toward secession
should be tempered by an appreciation of the powerful subnational forces loose in Azerbaijan. All of these tendencies compete
in a profoundly different political environment from what had
obtained only a few years ago.
One may identify several phases to the creation of this new
political environment in Azerbaijan. Begining in 1988 calls for
greater cultural autonomy emerged. 36 This could have been viewed
as a rejection ofRussification and Sovietization. It could also have
been seen as the initiation of a new political discourse, taking the
form, initially, of renewed interest in Azeri literature, linguistic.
matters, hitherto forbidden historiographic debates, and greater
freedom in Islamic activities. 37 In the next stage, evident in 1989,
demands were heard for economic and political autonomy. 38 A
sense of inequity, a feeling that the economic relations between
Moscow and Baku were ostentatiously asymmetrical pervaded
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Azeri oppositionist literature. 39 This notion of aggrievement extended also to the relations between Azeris and the Armenian and
Russian minorities. 40 Protests were framed also in the idiom of
environmentalism, reflecting the trend throughout the USSR. 41
Finally, by 1990 a new threshold had been achieved, the demand
among some informal groups for national self determination. 42
The existence of "informal" groups is, needless to say,
quite foreign to Soviet history. The proliferation of these associations, estimated to number in the range of 30-60,000 represent a
revolutionary development in domestic Soviet politics. 43 They
reflect concomitantly the emergence of a nascent civil society, an
embryonic multi-party system, and an instrument in Gorbachev' s
perestroika strategy.44 In Azerbaijan a plethora of informal groups
have emerged ranping from nationalist to environmentalist; Islamic to cultural. 4
As the authority of the Republican Communist Party
began to erode, the salient political force has become the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF). 46 It surfaced in 1988, the creation of
liberal, secular, Baku intellectuals. 47 As its initial statements
revealed it was a reformist informal organization entirely supportive of perestroika. 48 Its leaders renounced the use of force as a
legitimate means of expression and declared the APF's fealty to
the themes of humanism, democracy, pluralism, internationalism,
and human rights. 49 "The goal of the PFA" one document reveals,
"is legal government, a fully developed civil society and citizens
enjoying all their rights and freedoms. "50 Most significantly there
was no call for Azerbaijan's seccession from the USSR.
However, by late 1989 it was evident that the APF had
undergone fissions and radical transformations. This development cannot be viewed apart from the atmosphere of acute
conflict atmosphere which prevailed during this period. Furthermore, the fragmentation and radicalization of the APF is entirely
consistent with the developmental pattern of other such enterprises. Having begun their careers as moderate, reformist movements, groups such as the APF are liable to split into "moderate"
and "radical" factions. It is, in short, likely that the APF now refers
to a variety of ideological tendencies, ones which may harbour
contempt for each other. 51
For example one learns from Ebulfez Aliev, a leader of the
APF, that the group's basic orientation is ethnic Turkism. "The
objective," he states, "behind the establishment of the Popular
Front of Azerbaijan is to secure full sovereignty and independence
for Azerbaijan with a view to establishing the Turkish Republic of
Democratic Azerbaijan." 52 This vision, Kemalist in nature does
not, however, entail Azerbaijan's integration with Turkey. Ac-
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cording to Aliev: "Turkey's moral support will be enough for
us.,,53
Others such as Gamid Kharishchi, an ideologue of the
APF posits an Islamic vision. Rather than calling for secession,
Kharishchi looks forward to the withdrawal of, for instance, the
Balts, a move which would "intensify the Muslim influence in the
Soviet Union. 54 "Yes," Khanshchi has stated, "there are elements
of a jihad in our struggle. "55 His emphasis is on an Islamic
resistance to the Soviet government raising the prospect that
should the crunch come, support would be found in Iran, Turkey,
and the entire Muslim world. 56To these ideological divergencies
may be added, no doubt, many others. Ultimately though, the
direction taken by the APF and other groups will be determined
not only by the evolution of Azeri Civil Society but also by its
emerging "conflict society".
The Emergence of an Azerbaijani "Conflict Society"
Has ethnonationalism in Azerbaijan reached a point of no
return? Has the nascent and fragile civil society been eclipsed by
one dominated by disturbance and conflict? The easing of Soviet
control has set in motion powerful and unpredictable forces.
Today Azerbaijan is host to the concommitantrise of ethnonationalist assertiveness and civil warfare, a combination which will
have grave implications for the stability of the USSR and its
southern neighbors.
One may identify several sources of the emerging Azerbaijani conflict society. The most conspicuous over the past
several years has been the tension between Azeris and Armenians.
This is an ancient animosity. 57 Spasms of violence between these
communities punctuate the history of Transcaucasia. At one level
it may be defined as a religious conflict among Muslim Azeris and
Christian Armenians. 58 At another, it may be seen as a clash of two
ethnic communities, made more pronounced by their having
ideologized their identity in the form of nationalism. Here one
encounters the great energizer of sub-nationalist agitation: the
nationalist assertion that humanity is naturally divided into nations and each is entitled to the realization of territorial sovereignty.59 Such doctrinal stridency can only exacerbate relations
between groups making coexistence problematic as each is driven
by ideology, to define the legitimacy of the state in terms of its
ethnic or national identity. No doubt, the animosity felt between
Azeris and Armenians has been manipulated by Soviet authorities.60As it happens, the Azeris have long considered the Armenians in their midst to be "collaborators" with Moscow and a
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group which enjoyed a disproportionate measure of influence in
Azerbaijan. 61
The focus of the recent distemper between these communities has been over the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. This is a densly populated mountainous
enclave, demographically dominated by Armenians with a sizable Azeri minority. 62 Nevertheless, it rests geographically in the
Azerbaijani SSR. During the 1920' s, the decision was made by the
Soviet rulers, to place the NKAO under the jurisdiction of Baku. 63
In so doing, the regime ensured that between the Armenians, who
have never ceased demanding the return of the NKAO and the
Azeris who jealously guard their constitutional claims, there
would be a structural and self-perpetuating source of discord. This
tension was masked during the long decades of Sovietism. But
with the advent of perestroika and the return of civil society in the
USSR the debate over the NKAO resurfaced with a vengance.
The first move issued from Armenia. Armenian intellectuals were among the first to mobilize in the more relaxed
Gorbachev era. 64 Almost immediately the NKAO issue moved to
the forefront of the Armenian agenda. In 1988 a delegation of
Armenian intellectuals met with Gorbachev and his associates in
Moscow. 65 It was their hope that the Soviet authorities would
agree to a change in the NKAO's status. Having initially been
given encouragement in their pleadings, the Armenians moved
boldly in mobilizing popular s~port for this initiative in the
NKAO and throughout Armenia. The Azeri reaction was immediate and violent. Armenians were attacked in the NKAO, Baku
and in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait. 67
Attempts to assign culpability seem pointless: the Armenians were playing with fire, provoking a predictable reaction.
Analogically one may point to the agitations of the Zionists in
Baghdad during the 1930's and 1940's and the Muslim, Arab
response. As was the case with the Jews of Baghdad, the minority
status of the Armenians in Azerbaijan meant that to pose a
nationalist challenge to the majority was to illicit hostility albeit
one given martial expression in vastly asymmetrical terms. 68
Caught in the crossfire of clashing nationalist messianisms the
Armenians in Azerbaijan and the Azeris in Armenia were forced
to take flight as intercommunal violence spread through the
region. 69
For its part, the Soviet authorities, declared finally that
they would not look with favor upon the Armenian request. "The
frontiers of Armenia and Azerbaijan," Alexandr Yakovlev averred,
"are not to be touched." 70 However, the matter would not end
there. Violent forces had been loosed upon the area, creating a
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logic and momentum of their own.
From 1988 through 1990 the conflict intensified and
spread out from the NKAO to prevade both Azerbaijan and
Armenia. The Soviets attempted first to put the NKAO under its
direct control then sacked local party cadres only to see their
replacements identify themselves with Republican rather than
Soviet loyalties.71Durinf2this period the APF instituted strikes and
blockades on Armenia. 2 Both Azeri and Armenian armed groups
roamed the cities and countryside. 73 Intercommunal tension had
escalated to the point of civil war.
By 1990 the conflict environment was informed by an
additional element as clashes developed between Soviet forces
and Azeri irregulars. 74 In January 1990 numerous Azeris from the
Nakhichevan demonstrated along the Soviet-Iranian border. 75
The demonstrators, many of whom evinced sympathy with Iran's
Islamic Revolution demanded the ability to visit co-religionists
across the Arax River in Iranian Azerbaijan. 76 A cardinal Soviet
concern was exposed as calls were heard for the reunification of
Azerbaijan and the creation of "Greater Azerbaijan". 77 For decades the USSR had attempted to exploit Azerbaijan's division in
order to destabilize Iran. 7 Now, conceivably it is Iran's opportunity to reverse this pattern. To this prospect was added the tangible
reality of the APF's assertiveness, one which culminated in its
assumption of power in such towns as Lenkoran. 79 It was amid
these developments that the Soviet authorities were provided the
pretext to send in the troops.
The conflict is now a triangular one between Azerbaijani,
Armenian, and Soviet forces. It has been argued that what obtains
now are wars of "national liberation" as both Azeri and Armenian
groups openly resist Soviet control. 80 Mention is made in this
regard of the Armenian denunciation of the Soviet invasion of
Baku. 81 Mention is made also of the secessionist activities underway in Nakhichevan, an Azeri enclave situated in Armenia. 82
Whether or not the axis of conflict has shifted from an inter ethnic
one to an "anti-colonial" struggle, there may be no question that
the disturbences in Azerbaijan are formidable. "Yes," a Soviet
commentator reported to his Moscow audience, "one can say this
is a real war." 83
Dissent has, indeed, emerged in Moscow over what is seen
as a "second Afghanistan. " 84 The analogy is imperfect. Yet, as in
Afghanistan, the war in Transcaucasia has involved an array of
weapons and modes of engagement. 85 Questions have been raised
regarding the sources of Azeri and Armenian weaponry. 86 Of
course, it has also been speculated that the conflict is being
manipulated and exaggerated by the Soviet authorities as an
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element of Gorbachev's consolidation strategy. 87 All that may be
safely said is that the conflict environment in Azerbaijan is
extremely fluid. In such an atmosphere, masses which are disoriented, fearful and enraged may with equal probability lay passive
or be strirred into violent frenzy on behalf of some Messianism,
be it nationalist, ethnic, or religious.
The war in Azerbaijan throws into sharp relief a potentially new factor in Soviet domestic politics: the proliferation of
revolutionary terrorism. There is about this possibility a great
irony. Having for years been supportive of terrorism directed
against the West, the USSR now stands vulnerable before this
vexing form of political violence. 88 This vulnerability may be seen
in several ways. There is first the dilemma of rising political
expectations. These expectations increase as the totalitarian power
structure withers. However, ambitions are ultimately frustrated
by the dearth of sanctioned institutions by which they might be
satisfied. Such a condition may prompt groups working against
the system or toward its destruction to seek to do so through extralegal means. As it happens, many of the new formations in the
USSR are defined in terms of ethnonationalism, reflecting a
second source of vulnerability; internal ethnic fragmentation. 89
Having failed to overcome these divisions the Soviet leadership
has by its de-emphasis on Marxist-Leninism, removed the system's
sole transcending, concept of legitimacy. 90 The USSR is now
bereft of such an integrative vision.Upon what principle then may
Moscow's hegemony over Baku or Tiblisi be justified? For the
myriad of ethnonationalist groups emerging across the USSR the
answer is by no means obvious. Many may resort to terrorist
activity, 91 a trend symbolic of a third factor, the "radicalization
dynamic". Quite rapidly a dichotomy could emerge within many
of th~se groups, between "moderates" and "radicals", one which
generally devolves into a division between "compromisers" and
"purists". 92 Unable to out-promise, to speak in terms of absolutes,
constrained by position or temperament, the moderate is frequently overwhelmed by the radical whose message, undiluted by
nuance involves a devastating critique of the movement's "moderate leadership" and a compelling argument that through the
agency of political violence the ideological vision may be realised. The sanguine histones of countless ethnonationalist associations the world over speak directly to this theme. And, to be sure,
the radicalization of groups within the USSR may well put them
in league with extra-regional terrorist organizations. It is this
paradox of interdependence which represents a fourth vulnerability for the USSR. So central to Gorbachev's reform strategy,
interdependence means opening the USSR to foreign influences
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and interactions. 93 No doubt he would prefer selective interdependence. Yet, this is not a process susceptible to rigid control. It
is one which may have the unintended consequence of permitting
cooperation between terrorist organizations in the USSR and
abroad. 94Nowhere is the threat of such linkages more tangible
than in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Terrorism has indeed
arrived in the Soviet Union, a factor which will vastly complicate
the development of an Azeri civil society and contribute to the
escalation of ethnonationalist violence in the region.
But, what are the prospects that Azerbaijan might actually
secede form the USSR? Will the dynamics of these violent trends
lead inevitably to the creation of an independent Azerbaijan?
When all is said and done the answer is to be found not in Baku but
in Moscow. The historical lesson of the de-colonization of Asia
and Africa was not the efficacy or allure of national liberation
movements but rather the equivocation, self doubt, and resignation in the metropole. 95 This and a revised conception of the
USSR's national interest help explain the startling case with
which the countries of Eastern Europe broke from Soviet domination.96 An independent Azerbaijan would be the outcome of
decisions taken by Gorbachev and his associates. Thus, the issue
is purely one of speculation. Anything is possible: secession,
autonomy, the status quo even protracted civil war and fragmentation.

The International Politics of Azerbaijan Ethnonationalism
Who speaks for Baku? It can no longer be said that its fate,
its relations with the outside world are determined exclusively by
Soviet authorities. 97 Indeed, not since 1918 have stirrings in
Azerbaijan had such direct implications for International Relations. The most immediate affects relate directly to the international position and credibility of the USSR. Here one may observe
an intimate connection between subnationalist challenges and
International Relations ramifications.
For the USSR, Azerbaijan's assertiveness symbolizes the
general crisis of the Soviet system. The spectical of civil war in
Transcaucasia must raise doubts regarding the stability and long
term viability of the Soviet order. It must also underscore concerns
that Gorbachev's revitalization strategy is plagued by insurmountable contradictions and must lead ultimately to ethnonationalist implosion. Such an interpretation, correct or spurious,
cannot reflect beneficially on the USSR's international authority
and credibility, the currency of world politics.
This credibility may be undermined in another fashion. It
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is with some trepidation that much of the Muslim world views
Gorbachev's reorientation of Soviet foreign policy. In one sense
the USSR 's "New Thinking" entails forging alliances with a vast
international constituency on the basis of shared fealty to "global
human values" and the dynamics of interdependence. 98 Yet, in
another sense it means joining the USSR to the West creating a
Western monolith from San Francisco to Vladivostok or a Common European Home. From the Muslim perspective this is a house
without any Islamic wings. It is, moreover, seen as representing
but another chapter in the long struggle between the realms of
Christendom and Islam. It is reported that, alarmed at such a
development, the Ayatollah Khomeyni once warned Gorbachev
"not to fall into the embrace of the West." 99
Iran has, to be sure, pointed to what it views as an
asymmetrical Soviet and Western response to the concomitant
crises in the Baltics and Transcaucasia. "You travelled to Lithuania to negotiate," an Iranian commentator said of Gorbachev's
exertions, "but in Azerbaijan you simply issued the order for
massacre." 100 For Iran and other forces in the Middle East, Soviet
behavior in Azerbaijan and the muted Western reaction to these
actions symbolized a conspiracy visited upon Azeri Muslims. 101
Regardless of the merits of such an interpretation, should the
USSR be commonly identified as part of this Western conspiracy,
colonizing and oppressing Muslims, new complications may
attend its relations with remaining Third World radical regimes.
For its part Iran must view the rise of Azeri ethnonationalism with caution. Demands for the creation of a "Greater
Azerbaijan" involving the Union of Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan
represent challenge to Iran's territorial integrity. 102 Such a trend
would also upset relations internally between ethnic Iranians and
Azeris. Furthermore, it can only be with trepidation that Iran faces
the prospect of a United Azerbaijan, 15 million strong, possessing
a Caspian Seaboard and oil wealth, placed in its northern frontier.
This possibility is made more menacing by the realization that
such an entity might define itself not in terms of Shi' i fundamentalism but, rather, Turkish nationalism. 103 But, most immediately,
the Iranian government faces the prospect that, in their conflict
with Moscow, Soviet Azeris will take flight across the Iranian
border in search of sanctuary thereby providing the Soviet authorities with a pretext for incursions into Iran. 104 As was seen in
the Jordanian Crsis of 1970 the agitations of a subnationalist
movement may result in interstate tension with both regional and
international ramifications.
Despite such concerns the possibility may not be discounted that Iran will pursue an activist policy toward Soviet
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Azerbaijan. It is the case that Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, Iran's Prime
Minister declared that his government would not "align itself with
those who advocate the 9i sin tegration of the USSR. " 105However,
demands for a revolutionary approach have surfaced. 106 Although
Iran's revolution has been delivered formidable blows at home
and abroad it may yet serve as a source of cooperation, inspirational or tangible, for Muslim activists in Azerbaijan and Central
Asia. 107 Iran's Islamic message represents a coherent alternative
to the ideolorical and political ambiguity that now prevails in
Azerbaijan. 10 Moreover, should Moscow's grip weaken Iran's
interest in the future orientation towards Azerbaijan would undoubtedly be keen.
Turkey's interest would also be aroused. Historical ties,
ethnic affinities, and concerns lest the Armenians become emboldened, have drawn Turkey back to the center of events in
Transcaucasia. 109 The rise of Azeri ethnonationalism underscores
a great opportunity for Turkey as it presents itself as the leader of
the US SR' s vast Turkic population. "In the near future," a Turkish
official remarked, "we shall see the flags of Turkic governments
in Russia. " 110 The Turkish assertion is a formidable one, based on
the appeal of Turkish nationalism and the vision of Turkey as a
gateway to the West and a source of economic viability. 1 u In this
sense, Iran's Islamic vision of a post Soviet Azerbaijan is matched
by a Turkish nationalist conception.
Could it be that somewhere a Turkish Sykes and Iranian
Picot conspire to divide the spoils of the post Communist Transcaucasia and Central Asia? It is more like Iy that between Moscow,
Ankara, and Tehran a tacit understanding exists that ethnonationalist irredentism is to be discouraged. Should this be the
case the Azeris will join the Kurds and Armenians as nations
without states, continuing sources of regional tension.

Conclusion
What judgments may be made from this examination of
Azerbaijan's resurgent ethnonationalism? Whether or not one
views the disturbances in Azerbaijan as symbolic of the USSR 's
terminal crisis there can be no denying that powerful subnational
forces have been unleashed, ones which may prove to be beyond
the total control of central authorities despite the regime's pattern
of violent crackdown on independence tendencies in Transcaucasia and the Bal tics. Nevertheless, the history and political culture
of Azerbaijan provides little basis for optimism that the Republic's
post-Soviet experience will be stable and peaceful. Moreover, the
depth of animosity between Azeris and Armenians is likely to
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provide the region with an ongoing source of tension. This discord
will most probably provide other Soviet Republics and neighboring states with opportunities to seek advantage. Transcaucasia is
thus likely to remain a zone of international conflict, a theatre of
subnational and interstate rivalry .
One might point also to conclusions of a more general
nature. What is the relationship between ethnonationalism and
International Relations? Despite the sound and fury associated
with subnationalist movements world wide, it is the state which
dominates the international system. The state has not always been
paramount. Before the advent of the European state system ,
various aggregations prevailed. But since then, it has been the
nation state which has endured and dominated : endured for fear
that its sequel would be anarchy, dominated because of the
alacrity with which it has destroyed its challengers , universalistic
or particularistic.
It may be argued that those states that did not emerge out
of this European tradition are the artificial contrivances of imperialism. To this it must be said that all states are artificial and
contrived, all the outcome of violence and chance. But regardless
of their pedigree or orientation, the modern nation state has
betrayed a persistent intolerance toward sub-nationalist revisionism. During the century this intolerance has assumed a variety of
expressions, from mild discrimination to genocide. Countries as
disparate as Great Britain and India, Israel and Iraq, Spain and
Nigeria are shown to be quite similar in their aversion to ethnonationalist irredentism. The actions of the Soviet authorities in the
Bal tics at the begining of 1991 suggest that the experience of the
U.S.S.R . is consistent with the general pattern.
Ethnonationalism coexists uneasily with the state-system.
At once it serves as a potential physical challenge for territory, a
central factor in a state's internal and external affairs, a challenge
to the legitimacy upon which a state may rest, and a force to be
manipulated in one country ' s foreign policy toward another. It
remains among the most powerful sources of disturbance to the
international structure.
What of the "new world order' said to be arising out of the
Cold War's demise? Hitherto most speculations on this question
have had as their analytical point of departure the likelihood of a
new international consensus expressed through novel forms of
cooperation, resting on new forms of intellectual convergence and
political integration .112 Gone, according to this view , are the great
ideological conflicts and bloc antagonisms. Now, the advocates of
a Lockean new world order assert, a system of order and comity
is at last within sight. But could not Azerbaijan's recent experi83

ence suggest that to entertain such melioristic notions is to invest
in the process of political change unwarranted hopes and expectations? Is it, perhaps, not more prudent to suppose that great
changes, however desirable, must, as a matter of course, occasion
new and unforeseen disturbances as groups continue as they
always have to seek influence, power, advantage, and to sustain
differences among themselves?
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